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THE DUTY NOT TO DELIVER LEGAL SERVICES*
MARC GALANTER**

Professor Galantersuggests that the traditionalapproach to providing legal services in terms of demand (legal needs) and supply
(lawyer's services) is inadequate and that alternative methods of
providing the benefits of law to everyone must be developed.
Arguing that the inequities of the present system stem from the
fact that litigationgenerally pits an individual party against an
organizationalparty with the organizationenjoying a sizable advantage, the authorsuggests that such alternativesas simple and
accessible public forums, private sector tribunals, aggressive
champions, more competent and organized parties, as well as
various forms of augmented legal services may replace the delivery of traditional lawyers' services as the responsibility of the
legal profession.
I.

THE DUTY

To

DELIVER WHATEVER IT

Is

THAT LAW

Is GOOD

FOR

Why should anyone have a duty to deliver legal services? Canon
2' speaks of the profession's "duty to make legal counsel available."
In one common view, such a duty proceeds from the notion that law
confers benefits, both on the society at large and on individuals, and
that if these benefits are not secured, the remedy is to "make legal
counsel available." That is the supply side-how the benefits of law
are to be delivered. The demand side is visualized by the notion of
legal need-the notion that we can specify the instances in which
these benefits are not realized and thus compile a list of unmet legal
needs. So legal services meet legal needs; the benefits of law will
then be bestowed upon all and all's well with the world.
I would like to suggest some of the deficiencies of this
view-both of its diagnosis of demand and its prescription of supply.
In doing so, I shall move away from discussion on duty. I find it
generally uncongenial to speak in terms of duty, even someone
else's. I hope that some of the duty talk can be translated into talk
* The analysis in this paper draws heavily on the analysis in a prior paper written by
Professor Galanter. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REv. 95 (1974).
** Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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about options and opportunities. (We can return later to see if this
tells us anything about duties.)
But let us start with duty. If there is a duty to make legal
counsel available, it must derive from a larger duty to deliver to
society and its members the benefits of legality. That is, if we were
to speak of a duty to provide medical care, such an obligation would
presumably derive from a duty to foster and maintain the health of
the community and of individuals. Similarly, the legal profession
presumably enjoys its privileged position because it is the repository
of society's commitment to values of order, justice and fairness.
Presumably, any duty that the profession owes stems from the commitment to these values. We know that ordinarily this duty is discharged by individual service to individual clients. However, lawyers are not insensible to various other means of securing these
values to the public. Indeed, the bar's attempt to regulate the practice of law represents a massive collective undertaking to see that
the benefits of law are delivered in proper fashion.
But before plunging into the problem of delivering legal services, let us ask what legal services are good for? What is law good
for? We are talking about access to whatever law is good for. Whatever these benefits are, we suspect that they are not delivered as
regularly or equally as we would like. But before we discuss ways to
remedy this, let us attempt to specify the benefits that are being
discussed.
Obviously, the presence of law confers benefits of various kinds
on society as a whole-stability, channels for orderly change or perhaps efficient allocation of resources. I shall put aside these collective benefits for the moment and concentrate on distributive benefits: those which access to law presumably bestows upon actors,
individuals or groups, within the society. Among these are surely
such things as: (1) protection, security; (2) remedies for a variety of
grievances and claims; (3) securing the accountability of officials;
(4) participation in decision-making; (5) feelings of justice, fairness;
and (6) employment of facilitative rules to accomplish a variety of
purposes.
For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to these collectively
as "legality," recognizing that the mix of goals will vary with the
perceiver as well as with actors. It is presumably for the purpose of
providing these that the profession enjoys privileges and has a "duty
to make legal counsel available."
Much discussion of legal services seems to proceed on the as-
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sumption that we can specify the instances in which these benefits
are not realized and thus compile a list of unmet legal needs. There
are reasons to suspect the adequacy of this approach. In a recent
article Leon Mayhew has brilliantly analyzed the inadequacy of the
"legal needs" way of conceptualizing the problem. 2 He cautions us
not to assume that there are a set of claims and problems "out
there" which fail to be met because legal services are unavailable.
Neither surveys of the experiences of the public nor the patterns of cases brought to legal agencies produce a particularly
valid measure of the "legal needs" of the citizenry. Needs for
legal services and opportunities for beneficial legal action cannot
be enumerated as if they were so many diseases or injuries in need
of treatment. Rather, we have a vast array of disputes, disorders,
vulnerabilities, and wrongs, which contain an enormous potential
for generation of legal actions. Whether any given situation becomes defined as a "legal" problem, or even if so defined, makes
its way to an attorney or other agency for possible aid or redress,
is a consequence of the social organization of the legal system and
the organization of the larger society-including shifting currents
of social ideology, the available legal machinery, and the channels for bringing perceived injustices to legal agencies. 3
We should be grateful to Mayhew for the insight that legal
needs are not some Archimedian starting point against which we
can measure the adequacy of legal services, but are themselves the
product of, among other things, the way in which the legal system
and legal services are organized. He reports, for example, that in a
survey of metropolitan Detroit in 1967, "less than one percent of the
women interviewed . . .said they had ever been discriminated
against by reason of their sex. . . ."' This response, he concludes,

might have been different had the respondents
applied a higher level of legal and sociological imagination to the
question . . .but the necessary attitudes and information for

seeing such discrimination were then relatively undeveloped. Nor
were there any well developed channels for routing cases of such
discrimination to the attention of attorneys and legal agencies. ',
2. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 401 (1975).

3. Id. at 404.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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So "legal need" in such a case (or in the case of family problems or
consumer problems) is itself a reflex of the opportunities and resources provided by the legal system. The "needs" to be filled, then,
are not a primitive given, but an institutionally and ideologically
contingent selection from a vast pool of amorphous "proto-claims."
Let us turn from demand to supply. If needs are contingent, it
is similarly problematic whether any given set of needs can best be
filled by provision of legal services. The tendency has been to assume that the deficiences in access to law can most effectively be
met by more and better legal services; that legal services are the key
missing resource. I suggest that this is not always the case; that we
must compare the costs and benefits of alternative ways of delivering legality and that (1) in some cases there are excessive costs to
delivering legality through the medium of legal services, and (2) in
some cases legal services are insufficient without some admixture of
other factors. We then must contemplate a more complex field in
which there are many possible sets of needs which might be served
by a variety of alternative paths to the benefits of legality.
II.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DELIVERING LEGALITY

I would like to address myself to some of these alternative options and strategies for performing the functions which, it has sometimes been assumed, could only be performed by legal services. For
purposes of this analysis, I will make some gross simplifying assumptions about the legal system (including the assumption that
such a "system" can be meaningfully isolated from its social context). However, for present purposes, let us think of that system as
comprised of four elements or levels: (1) a body of authoritative
normative learning-for short, RULES; (2) a set of institutional
facilities (courts, administrative agencies, etc.) within which the
normative learning is applied to specific cases-for short, COURTS;
(3) a body of persons with specialized skill in dealing with the
above-for short, LEGAL SERVICES; and (4) persons or groups
with claims they might make to the courts with reference to the
rules-for short, PARTIES.
Consider some of the ways in which each of these components
might be transformed so as to enhance the access of individuals to
the benefits of legality. (Of course, increasing the access of some
may reduce the legality benefits of others, but we shall ignore this
for the moment.) If there are alternative paths to providing legality,
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then we shall face questions of assessing their relative costs and
benefits.
(1) One may in various ways upgrade legal services. One may
seek changes in the recruitment, training, or ideology of the professionals rendering such services; one may seek changes in the organization of the delivery of those services; and one may seek changes
in the character of the services being offered. Obviously, there are
vast possibilities for enhancing access to legality through provision
of more, better, and new kinds of legal services. Because we have
all heard so much about these issues, I want to talk not about legal
services per se but about the way in which the other elements interact with legal services to amplify or diminish access possibilities.
(2) Another way to improve access is to change the rules.
Changes at the level of rules can provide greater (or reduced) access.
For example, a shift from individuated "fault" rules to "no fault"
can provide access to remedies by diminishing the complexity and
technicality of a claim, eliminating the need for difficult showings
of fact, employment of experts and use of professional advocates.
Furthermore, access to facilitative rules might be provided by the
development of pre-formed standardized packages ("canned transactions") requiring minimal use of professional advice. These are
examples of rule changes that deliver legality by reducing the need
for legal services. Most rule-change is, it hardly needs be said, not
of this kind. Typically, rule-change involves an increase in the complexity of the law and its remoteness from popular understanding
and thus greater dependence on professionals to deliver its benefits.
Typically, legal professionals have overestimated the benefits
that could be delivered through obtaining rule-changes from peak
institutions, especially from courts. A vast literature has documented the constantly rediscovered and never-quite-believed truths
that judicial (or legislative) pronouncements do not change the
world; that the benefits of such changes do not penetrate automatically and costlessly to their intended beneficiaries; that often they
do not benefit the latter at all. We have some notion of why rule
changes produced by courts are particularly unlikely to be important sources of redistributive change.' Like everything else, favora6. Favorable rule-change via the courts is an expensive process and the tradition and
ideology of the courts limit the scale and scope of changes. In addition, rule changes at the
court level do not penetrate automatically, costlessly and isomorphically to other levels
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ble rules are types of resources and those who enjoy other resources
tend to reap benefit from them. The basic question is how to enable
parties to secure the benefit of favorable rules.
(3) There are a great variety of proposals for providing greater
access through changes at the level of institutions. These might be
sorted out in a number of ways. Let me suggest some of the major
categories in terms of the departures they make from the model of
our ordinary courts. 7
(A) One classic response is to provide "small claims"
courts-that is, courts with lower costs and simpler procedure, overcoming barriers of cost, locational accessibility, intimidation and
incomprehensibility. 8
(B) One might instead attempt to provide institutions that
are mediative and compromise-seeking, rather than judgmental and
imposing a win/lose outcome.'
(C) One might attempt to change the character of courts by
creating tribunals that are more "popular," responsive and participatory rather than professional and alien, reducing the cultural and
psychological distance between tribunal and parties.'"
(D) One might instead encourage the development of tribunals in the private sector-such as the consumer forums operated
by the dry-cleaners, the carpet industry, and the home appliance
manufacturers," or by the Better Business Bureaus. More of these
because courts have less capacity than other rulemakers to allocate resources to secure implementation of new rules. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REV. 95 (1974); Hazard, Law Reforming in the AntiPoverty Effort, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 242 (1970).
7. I do not mention arbitration separately, since it is an omnibus category which might
refer to developments under several of the headings discussed below.
8. For a critical analysis of the extensive small claims literature, see Yngvesson &
Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature,9
LAW

& Soc'y

REV.

219 (1975).

9. Thus Nader and Singer call for "alternative forums to courts for resolving disputes
between people whose relationships are ongoing, and thus subject to mediated solutions,
reserving the courts for the one-shot, win-lose type of dispute ....
" Nader and Singer,
Dispute Resolution, 54 CAUF. STATE B.J. 281 (1976). See also Danzig & Lowi, Everyda
Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to ProfessorFelstiner, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 675 (1975).
10. For a comparative survey of the emergence of such "popular tribunals," see
N. Tiruchelvam, THE PoPuLAR TRIBUNALS OF SRI LANKA: A SOClO-LEGAL INQUIRY (Yale Law
School Program in Law and Modernization Working Paper No. 27, 1973).
11. See, e.g., the thorough analysis of the now-defunct Carpet and Rug Industry Con-
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may be spawned by the new FTC rules under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975."2
(E) Related to these are various devices that are not tribunals
but champions-something half way between a dispute processing
institution and an institution that provides representation. The
ombudsman 3 and the media ombudsman 4 (Action Line, etc.) are
the prime examples.
(F) Coming full circle, one may think of supplying institutions that are more "active"-i.e., that depart from the passive
umpire role of courts to take investigatory initiative, 5 and to secure,
assemble, and present proof, 6 to monitor performance, etc. Such
proactive institutions would reduce the advantages of differential
competence of the parties or their representatives. Advocacy of unrepresented interests may be built into the tribunal itself, as it was,
for example, in early workman's compensation boards. 1 The possisumer Action Panel (CRICAP) by M. McDonald, CRICAP RESOLVED CONSUMER COMPLAINT
AUDIT AND STUDY (Dec. 20, 1974).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq. (Supp., 1975).
13. See S. ANDERSON, OMBUDSMAN PAPERS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND PROPOSALS (1969);
D. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN (1973).
14. Information on media ombudsmen (e.g., newspaper action lines or television action
reporters) is rather slim. See Levine, Better Than Deep Throat, 7(2) Washington Monthly
42 (1975); B. SINGER, FEEDBACK AND SOCIETY at 41 (1973). Cerra, Free "Action" Services A
Help to Consumers-Well, Some, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1976, at 31, col. 1. For an interesting
cross-cultural perspective, cf. Ramundo, They Answer (to) Pravda in LAW IN THE SOVIET
SOCIETY

(W. LaFave ed. 1965).

15. This is an application of Donald Black's useful distinction between reactive mobilization of the legal process (i.e. on the basis of a citizen complaint) from proactive mobilization
(i.e. in which officials proceed on their own initiative). See Black, The Mobilization of Law,
2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 125, 128 (1973).

16. Cf. Homburger, Functions of Orality in Austrian and American Civil Procedure, 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 9 (1970). For a description of more "active" courts, see Kaplan, von Mehren
& Schaeffer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958), and
Homburger, supra. Of course, even among common law courts, passivity is relative and
variable. Courts vary in the extent to which they exercise initiative for the purpose of actively
protecting some class of vulnerable parties or developing a branch of the law.
17. P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY,
at 79 (1969), describes the California Industrial Accident Commission:
When the IAC in its early days assumed the responsibility of notifying the injured
worker of his rights, of filing his application for him, of guiding him in all procedural steps, when its medical bureau checked the accuracy of his medical record
and its referees conducted his case at the hearing, the injured employee was able
to obtain his benefits at almost no cost and with minimal demands on his intelligence and capacities.
In the American setting, at least, such institutional activism seems unstable; over time
institutions tend to approximate the more passive court model. See Nonet, supra in chs. 6-7,
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bilities here commend themselves to observers like Kimball and
Whitford, who suggest that effective processing of high volume, low
amount complaints may require abandonment of adversary processes and substitution of inquisitorial adjudication."
(4) Finally, one may think of changes at the level of the parties. I submit that the fundamental problems of access to legality
can best be visualized as problems of the capability of parties. That
is, that lack of capability poses the most fundamental, as well as
the most neglected, barrier to access and that, correspondingly,
upgrading of party capacity holds the greatest promise for promoting access to legality. Party capability includes a range of personal
capacities which can be summed up in the term "competence":
ability to perceive grievance, information about availability of remedies, psychic readiness to utilize them, ability to manage claims
competently, and seek and utilize appropriate help. 9 Recently we
have had a major development in this line of inquiry by Douglas
Rosenthal who found that superior results were obtained by "active" personal injury plaintiffs."0
Beyond these personal competences, there is, I submit, a related set of structural factors, including the size and organization
of the party. The relevance of the structure of the parties may be
gauged by reflecting on our common sense view of legal services. In
a recent article the president of the new Legal Services Corporation
described its goal as insuring "that the poor receive the same quality
and range of service that is provided to the rich."'" If we think of
"the poor" as receiving the same "quality and range of service that
is provided to the rich" we may have in mind the poor man writing
and see generally M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, ch. 7
(1955), on the "judicialization" of administrative agencies.
18. Whitford & Kimball, Why Process Consumer Complaints? A Case Study of the
Office of the Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin, 1974 Wisc. L. REV. 639.
19. The personal competence notion has been set forth by Carlin & Howard, Legal
Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381 (1965). See also Nonet, supra note
8.
20. D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974). "Active" clients were
defined as those who expressed special wants to their attorneys, made follow-up demands for
attention, marshalled information to aid the lawyer, sought quality medical attention, sought
a second legal opinion, and bargained about the fee. Rosenthal found that such "active"
clients were drawn disproportionately from those of higher social status, which presumably
provided both the confidence and the experience to conduct themselves in this active manner.

21. Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339, 1342 (1975).
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his will or pursuing his automobile injury claim in the same manner
that his rich counterpart does. Well enough, but we would, I think
be misreading the most central facts about the law in contemporary
United States. The real disparities in the use of law and in the
provision of legal services, I submit, are not between rich and poor
individuals but between individuals and organizations. Legal contests (or non-contests) do not take place between rich persons and
poor persons. They take place, for the most part, between individuals on the one side and large organizations on the other. Typically,
the occasion is one of a kind for the individual; it is an emergency
or at the least a disruption of routine, propelling him into an area
of hazard and uncertainty. For the organization (usually a business
or government unit), on the other hand, making (or defending
against) such claims is typically a routine and recurrent activity.
The law game is so constructed that such recurrent organizational players enjoy strategic advantages over infrequent individual
players. Briefly, these advantages include:
(1) ability to utilize advance intelligence, structure the next
transaction and build a record;
(2) ability to develop expertise and have ready access to
specialists, economies of scale, and low start-up costs for any case;
(3) opportunity to develop facilitative informal relations with
institutional incumbents;
(4) ability to establish and maintain credibility as a combatant; (i.e., interest in "bargaining reputation" serves as a resource
to establish "commitment" to bargaining positions. With no bargaining reputation to maintain, the one-time litigant has more difficulty in convincingly committing himself in bargaining);
(5) ability to play the odds. The larger the matter at issue
looms for the one-timer, the more likely he is to avoid risk (i.e.,
minimize the probability of maximum loss). Assuming that the
stakes are relatively smaller for recurrent litigants, they can adopt
strategies calculated to maximize gain over a long series of cases,
even where this involves the risk of maximum loss in some cases;
(6) ability to play for rules as well as immediate gains. It pays
a recurrent litigant to expend resources in influencing the making
of the relevant rules by lobbying. Recurrent litigants can also play
for rules in litigation itself, whereas a one-time litigant is unlikely
to.
There is a difference in what they regard as a favorable outcome. Because his stakes in the immediate outcome are high and
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because by definition the one-timer is unconcerned with the outcome of similar litigation in the future, he will have little interest
in that element of the outcome which might influence the disposition of the decision-maker next time around. For the recurrent litigant, on the other hand, anything that will favorably influence the
outcomes of future cases is a worthwhile result. The larger the stake
for any player and the lower the probability of repeat play, the less
likely that he will be concerned with the rules which govern future
cases of this kind. Consider, two parents contesting the custody of
their only child, the prizefighter versus the IRS for tax arrears or the
convict facing the death penalty. On the other hand, the player with
small stakes in the present case and the prospect of a series of
similar cases may be more interested in the state of the law (e.g.,
the IRS, the insurance company, or the prosecutor).
Thus, if we analyze the outcome of a case into a tangible component and a rule component, we may expect that in any case, the
one-timer will attempt to maximize tangible gain. However, if the
recurrent litigant is interested in maximizing his tangible gain in a
series of cases, he may be willing to trade off tangible gain in any
one case for rule gain (or to minimize rule loss). We would then
expect recurrent litigants to "settle" cases where they expected
unfavorable rule outcomes. Since they expect to litigate again,
such litigants can select to adjudicate (or appeal) those cases which
they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules. On the other
hand, one-timers should be willing to trade off the possibility of
making "good law" for tangible gain. Thus, one would expect the
body of "precedent"-i.e., cases capable of influencing the outcome of future cases-to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to the current litigant."
It would appear that in general terms, organizations occupy a
position of advantage in the configuration of contending parties. As
might be expected, those who occupy this position of advantage
tend to enjoy other advantages as well. Foremost among these are
22. It is not suggested that the strategic configuration of the parties is the sole or major
determinant of rule-development. The point here is merely to appreciate the superior opportunities of the organizational litigant to trigger promising cases and prevent the triggering of
unpromising ones. If we recall that rules do not automatically and costlessly confer advantages on their intended beneficiaries, we come to yet another major advantage of the organizational litigant. Such a party is more likely to be able to invest the matching resources (e.g.,
knowledge, attentiveness, expert services, money) necessary to secure the benefit of rules
favorable to it.
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massive disparities in the quality and quantity of legal services
utilized by individuals and by organizations. Indeed, legal professionals in the United States can be roughly dichotomized into those
who provide a limited range of services to individuals on an episodic
basis and those who provide a wider range of services to organizations on a more continuing basis. Although there are many exceptions and irregularities, there is a pattern of massive difference in
education, skill and status between these groups. There is also a
massive difference in the quality of services provided. The profession is organized to provide a wide range of services to organizations
and a much narrower range to individuals.
Are we to use as the standard of "quality, scope and character,"
of representation which a poor person is entitled, that which is
supplied to General Motors or the Tobacco Institute? That would
include a wide array of preventive and planning work as well as work
in a variety of legislative and administrative arenas to secure favorable rules and avoid unfavorable ones. It is doubtful that either the
Legal Services Corporation or pre-payment plans will be in a position to employ such a standard. To pose such a quixotic goal reveals
more than the limitations of these worthy undertakings. It points to
the fact that parties differ in their capacity to utilize legal services. 3 What is routine and rational for an organization is monstrous for an individual. If we take an isolated individual, with his
claim or grievance or ambition, it is indeed a rare instance in which
23. Legal services are one vehicle through which differences in party capability have
effect, but we cannot reduce those differences to differences in the supply of legal services.
First, the capacity to use law effectively is not something supplied exclusively by professionals
and entirely separable from the parties themselves. Parties themselves can have different
levels of capacity to utilize the legal services. For example, Douglas Rosenthal found that
superior results were obtained by "active" personal injury plaintiffs. See text accompanying
note 15 supra. A study of California small claims courts, in which lawyers were not permitted
to appear, found that businesses that were frequent users "formed a class of professional
plaintiffs who have significant advantaqes over the individual." Note, The Persecution and
Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in
California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657 (1969).
Further, there seems to be comparative evidence that major distinctions in party competence can exist quite apart from disparities in legal services. The reports of Kidder (Kidder,
Formal Litigation and ProfessionalInsecurity: Legal Entrepreneurshipin South India, 9 LAW
& Soc'v REV. 11 (1974); Kidder, Courts and Conflicts in an Indian City: A Study in Legal
Impact, 11 J. COMMONWEALTH POL. STUDIES 121 (1973)) and Morrison (Morrison, Clerks and
Clients: ParaprofessionalRules and Cultural Identities in Indian Litigation, 9 LAW & Soc'v
REV. 39 (1974)) on litigation in India suggest a distinction between the "experienced" or
"chronic" litigant and the naive and casual one which seems to be quite independent of the
organization of legal services.
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the kinds of options that are routine for a large organization will be
feasible and effective.24 In brief, these forums and the resources
that one must marshall to be effective in them, are just the wrong
size for individuals. For the most part, individuals have claims or
grievances that are too small, relative to the costs of remedies, or
too large, relative to their need to be risk aversive. The basic problem of making individuals effective players of the law game is to
find means of aggregating claims that are too small, or sharing (or
dispelling) risks that are too large.
There are a variety of methods of aggregation. By aggregation
I mean ways of organizing individuals into coherent groups that
have the ability to act in a coordinated fashion, look out for their
long-range interests, benefit from high grade legal services, and
employ long-run strategies. Consider the ways in which parties can
become effective legal actors.
One alternative is the membership association which acts as a
bargaining agent on behalf of individuals who share a particular
interest. The outstanding example is of course the trade union. Tenant unions are a less successful instance.
Another interesting pattern is the assignee-manager of fragmentary rights. The outstanding example that comes to mind is a
performing rights association like the American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP). This type of organization
solves a problem that is not wholly unlike the problem of vindicating many consumer and environmental rights today. That is, that
the holders of these rights have tiny fragments that are not worth
the cost of remedies or the cost of monitoring to assure their
performance.25 This kind of alternative deserves more attention.
24. But see Cramton, supra note 16. "If the client's interests are best served by negotiation and settlement, that course should be followed. But if litigation is necessary, it should
be pursued to the hilt. An appeal from an adverse decision below should be taken when the
interests of the client would be served. And participation in administrative or legislative
proceedings may often be appropriate or necessary in order to advance or protect the client's
interest." Id. at 1342-43.
25. Prior to 1914, individual authors, composers and publishers realized little in
the way of royalties for the public performance of their compositions. It was
impossible for individuals to maintain constant surveillance throughout the fortyeight states and to collect royalties for each performance of their musical compositions. It was also difficult for them to prosecute each establishment which performed their music without the payment of royalties. The problem of collecting
royalties and protecting copyrights was met by joint action of the authors, composers and publishers. Where individual action could be sporadic and ineffectual,
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Imagine, for example, if a large number of people assigned their
various rights to be free of pollution or impure food to an association
which would manage these rights, engage in appropriate monitoring
activity, and could seek damages in instances of violation. One can
think of a number of serious obstacles to such an effort, including
rules against champerty, possible public policy limits on the assignability of such claims, and formidable difficulties of organization.
(A device that bears some striking similarities is the collection
agency which assembles many similar claims which can be handled
in a routine fashion.) This kind of device would overcome some of
the arguments raised against class actions-their cumbersomeness, the burden on the courts and their self-appointed "misrepresentation" of affected parties.
Finally there is the interest group-sponsor (e.g., NAACP,
ACLU, and environmental action groups) which has had a major
impact and will undoubtedly continue to do so. However, none are
able to provide regular and dependable service to individuals; nor
is their deployment of legal resources accountable to the constituency on whose behalf they speak.
All of these means of aggregation involve the formation (or
utilization) of organizations. An organized group is not only better
able to secure favorable rule changes in courts and elsewhere, but
is better able to see that good rules are implemented." An organization can expend resources on surveillance, monitoring, threats and
litigation that would be economically infeasible for any individual.
Such a group would enjoy the strategic advantages that accrue to
recurrent organizational litigants. In America, at least, law is a
complex and expensive activity requiring employment of full-time
specialists. Organizations can use the law rationally and routinely
because they are the right size.
But organization is not cheap. Organizing such a group represents an outlay of money, energy, attention, and entrepreneurial
combined resources and vigilance and concerted threats of prosectuon for copyright infringement enabled the copyright owners to force the many users to pay
for the public performance privilege.
Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right
Societies, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 275, 284 (1954), quoting complaint in United States v.
ASCAP, Filed June 23, 1947, (S.D.N.Y.), Civil Action No. 42-245, Para. 9.
26. See, e.g., L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS
COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 168-73 (1968) (discussion of the greater strategic thrust
of group sponsored complaints in the discrimination area).
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skill. For various reasons a class of claimants may be relatively
incapable of being organized. Its size, relative to the size and distribution of potential benefits, may require disproportionately large
inputs of coordination and organization.27 Or a shared interest may
be insufficiently respectable to be publicly acknowledged (but cf.
the example of homosexual groups).. Or individuals may have no
permanent or predictable identification with a particular interest,
but occupy various positions interchangeably (e.g., home buyer and
seller, automobile driver and pedestrian). Because few interests are
likely to impel organization on their own account, the input of
organization will in most instances have to come from groups that
are already organized for other purposes.
There are other methods of aggregation that do not entail organization. One is the clearing-house which establishes a communication network among individuals with similar interests (lowering
the cost of information and providing enhanced power to assert
control through effect on reputation). A minimal but widespread
instance of this is represented by the "media ombudsman" (e.g., the
action line type of newspaper column).
Perhaps the most widespread of all aggregation devices is governmentalization; utilizing the criminal law or the administrative
process to make it the responsibility of a public officer to press
claims that would be unmanageable in the hands of private
grievants. This is typically a weak form of aggregation, for several
reasons. First, there is so much law that officials typically have far
more to do than they have resources to do it with. Therefore, they
tend to wait for complaints and to treat them as individual
27. Olson argues that capacity for coordinated action to further common interests decreases with the size of the group: "Relatively small groups will frequently be able voluntarily
to organize and act in support of their common interests, and some large groups normally
will not be able to do so. . . ." M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GRouPS 127 (1965).
Where smaller groups can act in their common interest, larger ones are likely to be
capable of so acting only when they can obtain some coercive power over members or are
supplied with some additional selective incentives to induce the contribution of the needed
inputs of organizational activity. (On the reliance of organizations on these selective incentives see Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1969);
Clark & Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations,6 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129 (1961)).
Such selective incentives may be present in the form of services provided by a group already
organized for some other purpose. Thus many interests may gain the benefits of organization
only to the extent that those sharing them overlap with those with a more organizable interest
(consider, e.g., the prominence of unions as spokesmen for consumer interests).
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grievances.2 8 Second, enforcers have a pronounced tendency not to
employ litigation against established and respectable institutions."2
Consider the reaction of Arizona's Attorney General to the litigation
initiated by the overzealous chief of his Consumer Protection Division, who had recently started an investigation of hospital pricing
policies.
I found out much to my shock and chagrin that anybody who
is anybody serves on a hospital board of directors and their reaction to our hospital inquiry was one of defense and protection.
My policy concerning lawsuits

. . .

is that we don't sue any-

body except in the kind of emergency situation that would involve [a business] leaving town, or sequestering money or
records. .

. I can't conceive any reason why hospitals in this

state are going to make me sue them."0
The class action may also be thought of as a device for securing
the benefits of organization. It attempts to secure the benefits of
scale without undergoing the outlay for organizing. Clearly its scope
is going to be more limited than many had hoped. And its costs and
benefits compared to other aggregating devices remain to be measured.
The search for ways to provide legality propels us into
unexplored terrain. We face choices between alternative paths of
providing legality-simple and accessible public forums, private
sector tribunals, aggressive governmental champions, more competent and organized parties, as well as various forms of augmented
28. See, e.g., L. MAYHEW, supra note 21 (antidiscrimination commission); McIntyre, A
Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968);
Steele, Fraud,Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1107 (1975) (consumer fraud and complaint bureau); cf. P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY,
AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 225 (1969) (observations on a general "tendency to turn enforcement
agencies into passive recipients of privately initiated complaints ....
The focus is more on
settling disputes than on affirmative action aimed at realizing public goals.").
29. E.g., The Department of Justice position is that the penal provisions of the Refuse
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1971), should be brought to bear only on infrequent or accidental
polluters, while chronic ones should be handled by more conciliatory and protracted procedures, 1 ENV. RETR. CUR. DEV. No. 12 at 288 (1970); Goldstein & Ford, The Management of
Air Quality: Legal Structures and Official Behavior, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1971) (patterns of
air pollution enforcement).
30. N.Y. Times, April 22, 1973, § 1, at 39, col. 1; cf. Cappelletti, Governmental and
Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH.
L. REV. 793 (1975) (examining the means by which public interests are represented in civil
proceedings).
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legal services. Obviously the choice in any given case will have to
depend on a detailed assessment of costs and benefits. I stress here
the importance of informing ourselves about alternatives so that
such assessments can be made. We need to guard against automatically assuming that providing lawyers' services is the most appropriate way to solve the problem. Generally, I suspect, lawyers are an
expensive way, and one that carries the not inconsiderable danger
of promoting dependence on professionals.
III.

CONCLUSION

The duty to promote access to legality may sometimes imply a
duty to supply legal services on an individual client model. But if
there is a responsibility to provide access to legality in the most
effective way, it may in other cases imply a duty to provide access
in some alternative form. One may, in many cases, arrive at an
obligation not to supply legal services-at least not in the manner
referred to in Canon 2 as "mak[ing] legal counsel available."
This leads us back to the question of the responsibility of the
profession. Will the legal profession define its responsibility broadly
to encompass development of all the paths to legality, or will it
confine its responsibility to the provision of legal services in the
narrower sense? Will it take as its responsibility the provision of
access to legality through various means, or only by means of its own
special product, individual legal advice and representation? It is
difficult to separate prescription from prediction here, for one can
only guess at these trends.
One may find in the broader vision exciting possibilities for
diversification. Obviously lawyers could contribute a great deal to
the design, management and monitoring of new institutions (grievance procedures, mediation boards, complaint bureaus) and serve
as catalysts-advisors-managers of various kinds of organizations
around specific legal interests. The bar is a vast storehouse of knowledge and seasoned judgment about how remedies and participation
may be effectively secured. It seems likely that the innovators and
entrepreneurs who develop and disseminate these new devices will
be drawn from the ranks of lawyers.
So far, I join Raymond Marks3' in expecting the profession's
31. Marks, A Lawyer's Duty To Take All Comers, and Many Who Do Not Come, 30
U. MIAMI L. REV. 915 (1976).
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contribution to be distributive rather than collective. One should
not place great store in hopes that a group as diverse and composite
as the American legal profession will make it a collective endeavor
to provide legality, or even legal services for that matter. However,
one would expect that professionally imposed barriers to provision
of legal services would fall in response to competition from other
forms of access. Raymond Marks suggests as an alternative the
notion of an individualized duty, but there remain crucial questions
before the profession as a whole. For example, how much will it
permit or encourage the development within itself of a segment that
concerns itself with these other ways of delivering legality-a decision that might in the long run affect the shape and scale of the
profession.
One might imagine a collective undertaking by the profession
to promote such developments. Or one might imagine the role of the
profession as the more modest and passive one of permitting and
encouraging such entrepreneurial activity by a group of innovators
within the profession. In the first scenario, the profession collectively embraces and implements a broad view of access to legality.
Perhaps some day it will, but I believe that in the short run its role
will be more restricted. What it may contribute is general authorization for innovative development and forbearance from retaliatory
restriction. This will be no small thing; resistance can be expected
because these new devices are clearly substitutes for lawyers' services (or at least consume them in very different forms).
I do not regard such a development as foreclosed. Lawyers in
the United States do not constitute a tightly knit, well-disciplined
professional guild of courtroom advocates, providing a narrow range
of services to clients from whom they remain aloof. Such a legal
profession might find itself unable to make room for the kind of
activity visualized here. But that is not a description of the legal
profession in the United States, which is distinguished by its diverse
and protean character, willingness to undertake new tasks, to operate in a wide range of institutional settings, to engage in an intensive
division of labor, and to form enduring alliances with clients. Precisely because the profession offers, in practice if not in theory, more
license to identify with clients and their causes, and a less restrictive
sense of the boundaries of professional activity, it is more ready-or
at least able-to serve an enlarged notion of professional responsibility. Such a responsibility may even encompass a duty not to
provide legal services when there are more effective paths to legality!

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:929

PANEL DISCUSSION

The following excerpts are taken from the panel discussion
which followed the papers delivered by Professor Marc Galanter and
Mr. Raymond Marks.
In addition to Professor Galanter and Mr. Marks, the panel
consisted of Ms. Elizabeth duFresne who has been associated with
the Greater Miami Legal Services Program and co-developer of a
group legal services plan for the United Teachers of Dade; Ms.
Fredricka Smith who is an attorney in Miami, Florida, and who
served as moderator of the panel; The Honorable Joseph Hatchett,
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida; Professor Bruce
Rogow, Associate Professor of Law at Nova University and past
assistant director of Legal Services in greater Miami; and Mr. David
Weinstein, director of the Connecticut State Judicial Information
Systems Project.
Ms. SMITH: I would like to start with a question to Mr. Weinstein.
What duty, if any, do you feel the bar has to provide these legal
services and who should define the need for legal services?
MR. WEINSTEIN: Thank you. I had the opportunity to speak at
several other forums somewhat like this, but sponsored by bar associations. I get nervous at these kinds of meetings where lawyers get
together to discuss their duty to serve their clientele, because I find
in those cases a hidden political agenda, and when I speak to the
bar groups, I find a rather more direct economic interest hidden
behind the word "duty."
In terms of the profession, these suggestions proposed by Mr.
Marks and Professor Galanter are not necessarily going to result in
the use of more lawyers. There are going to be more legal services
as broadly defined, but not necessarily more lawyers. And those
lawyers who remain in practice and take advantage of these newer
ways of organizing will be in larger and larger groups. The net result
of all these programs that realize a lawyer's duty to provide services
is some reduction of cost. The lower the cost, the more you are going
to eliminate the inefficient end of the legal service market, which
happens to be the solo and small firm general practitioner. Lawyers
will no longer have the opportunity to go into practice for themselves. You are either going to work for private conglomerations of
lawyers-no one really knows what size is efficient, maybe up to 19
or 20 lawyers-or you are going to work for corporations. I think
either of those can result in important consequences which have not
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been examined and we should not simply accept the notion of duty
to provide service which turns out to involve these other kinds of
shifts, without examining what these consequences are.
Ms. SMITH:
I think there is somebody on the panel who may disagree with you. I would like Ms. DuFresne to speak on that point.
Ms. DUFRESNE: I think the concept that the market place would
somehow magically solve the problems of delivery of legal services
has been disproved by the experience of practitioners. I represent
some teachers unions on a retainer basis, and I give them the corporate kind of services that we were talking about earlier; trying to
change the rules of the game, how the power is distributed, how the
state budget will go, and changing the rules for collective bargaining. It is this kind of broad concept that would change their power
base in society. We put a vote to the teachers on a group legal
services program that was approved by the bar, but they still feel
too poor to pay for a group legal services program.
As Mr. Marks suggested, you should have somebody who takes
the cases whether there is a fee or not. I can tell you there is a real
problem involved in trying to do that. Now my partner takes anybody who walks in the door. He loves the practice of law and he
thinks he gets repaid by practicing law. I think that is marvelous,
but we do have secretaries and rent, and I try to take care of that
aspect of the problem. I find I have gotten less and less cause oriented each year.
Ms. SMITH:
Let me ask Justice Hatchett, he told me before he had
a few things he would like to say.
JUSTICE HATCHETT: We are talking about doing all of the kinds of
things that shift the power relationships between the individual and
the large corporations, and what we really mean by duty is that we
are going to make more money. Isn't there something in all of this
that will allow lawyers to make more money? Certainly, there is, but
I do not see anything wrong with that because one of the problems
of the poor and the uneducated is the fact that they do not know
what they need. They have no ability to form these groups to lobby,
to decide what should be done in their community, or how to go
about it. And if we do not do it then there is no one else to do it.
Therefore, we do have to serve as a public utility, and we, as Mr.
Marks said, do want our lawyers making their own trouble. That is,
finding out where there are problems and doing something about it.
MS. SMITH:
If Judge Leventhal still has his question . . .
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JUDGE LEVENTHAL: 32

I address my question to Mr. Marks. Referring
to your use of the word "monopoly" it seems to me that a monopoly
is entitled to a fair return, and the return has to be paid by either
the public or the person who benefits from the advice. When you
propose that there is an obligation arising out of a monopoly, you
also should propose a meaningful way of compensating the monopolist.

MR. MARKS:

I do not disagree with that.

There is an obligation arising out of monopoly,
but you must also propose a meaningful way of compensating the
monopolist for the service that he renders. It seems to me that
whenever you present the monopolist's duty, you have a correlative
duty to present, as an entire description of his duties, how he is to
be compensated.
MR. MARKS: I did not expect in the ultimate sense that the burden
would rest on lawyers. But by imposing the burden on lawyers, in
the first instance, I really think that it would hold their feet in the
fire, corporately and individually, to come up with a scheme of
social insurance or of tax write off and credit. If we leave the burden
there indefinitely, it would work an injustice in the long run, but I
really think lawyers are capable.
JUDGE LEVENTHAL: Suppose the tax write off makes the public pay
for it, the way they do with tax benefits for having an insurance
negligence plan. I think that is a very debatable issue in policy. It
seems to me that a program of compensation is needed that does not
fall on the public. I am not talking about the poor now, that is a
separate category. We begrudge the poor a little bit to pay for their
legal services, which is not nearly enough and never will be enough.
But it seems to me, using the conventional analysis of law, you do
have a way of meeting a need and you must have a correlative way
of assessing a fee on those who benefit without having the problem
of the free rider.
PROF. ROGOW: You talk about the monopoly being entitled to a fair
rate of return, I think everybody agrees the monopoly is entitled to
a fair rate of return. But the lawyer who is making $100,000 a year,
is getting more than a fair rate of return for being a lawyer and for
having that monopoly. Therefore, I think some of the compensation
is already there.
JUDGE LEVENTHAL:

32. Judge Leventhal presented the keynote address for the Conference, supra at 789, and
was speaking from the audience.
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The large law firms do set up various service
departments, and everybody devotes their attention and time to
some public service work. However, we are not talking about a significant number of hours, and to put it on the line, those hours have
to be billed out somehow, or you can't survive.
PROF. ROGOW:
Perhaps the $100,000 figure I used was too large.
There was a recent survey in the Florida Bar Journal, which presented the income of lawyers in Florida, and it surprised me. I think
that about 30 percent of lawyers in Florida were making more than
$30,000 a year. Those lawyers have a fair return on their services.
Even a little lower figure might be a fair return.
JUDGE LEVENTHAL:
You say, $30,000 is a point that puts on the
lawyer the burden of rendering services without additional compensation. When you draw a line at $100,000 that may be a valid point,
but when you draw it at $30,000, it reflects your own rather narrow
lens.
PROF. ROGOW: I understand that, and I think you are right. It does
reflect my own bias, but I do not back off from this position. Perhaps
my position is strengthened as I raise the dollar amount, but I think
at some point, we can draw the line. There does come a time when
lawyers are getting more than a fair return, and it is at that point
that I think lawyers ought to contribute in some way. An alternative
is that perhaps they should contribute dollars, if not time. I do not
have any great objection to that. As a matter of fact, I think I prefer
the dollars to the time. Those dollars would then go to fund lawyers
who would devote full time.
JUDGE LEVENTHAL:

QUESTION: I wonder about priorities, when a person does not have
a sufficient amount to eat, as a significant portion of this country
does not, and he does not have sufficient medical services, as a
significant portion does not. It seems to me that given the allocation
of resources, the prioritiesare a bit out of line. I hate to betray my
future profession, but there is a huge mass of individuals living off
these poor people. A tremendous amount of money is being bundled
into their pockets when it should be going for medical services and
food which are more important. Then when they have the basic
rudiments, in terms of medical services, food, and the ability to
read, they can better avail themselves of legal services. The whole
concept of legal services is just premature.

It is true, the big money is in poverty, but it is not
for poor people; at least the money does not go there. Certainly there

PROF. ROGOW:
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are more important needs that have to be met; basic physiological
needs that we ought to devote our time to. I think there are a lot of
lawyers who are concerned about it, who are practicing law for poor
people and who do make an attempt to try to meet those needs by
bringing suits against medicare laws, food stamp laws, and trying
to make it a little more equitable. It is just chipping away at a huge
piece of ice with a small ice pick. I would like to see some restructuring of need, but we are here at the law school; if we were at the
medical school, we could talk about something different.
QUESTION: Does Detroit have to burn again? It seems like none of
us are particularly concerned. It is the quiet seventies.
PROF. ROGOW: I will tell you what surprises me. Look around. Go
to South Miami Beach and see the elderly poor. Forget about Detroit burning. There are a lot of people around here who are very
poor, who are making do with their social security payments, and
it is a sad situation. It is that kind of thing that offends me, when
you have judges complaining that they are making $36,000 a year,
and that this is not enough. That is why I draw the line. Maybe I
will raise it to $36,000, Judge Leventhal, which is the circuit court
judge level here. But, you are right, we need some changing of our
priorities.
JUDGE LEVENTHAL: I really regard that as frivolous.
PROF. ROGOW: This is the second time that I have had the same
kind of dispute with you, Judge Leventhal. At least we maintained
our same views in the past 2 years. It was a money issue then, and
you called my view frivolous.
JUDGE LEVENTHAL: I do not see a need to apologize for making, as
it happens, $44,000. I gave up an income in the six figures to come
on the bench, but the point that I was making involved the arrogance on your part in presuming to dictate the level at which certain
services to the community should be compensated. If you represent
the way of the future, and you are willing to be leveled out on your
level, I think that is fine. But to say there is an absolute duty, and
that you are going to set the level represents a certain amount of
arrogance. It is very appealing to young people, and you have a
marvelous audience here, except that it does not seem to me that
you are addressing yourself to the realistic question; how to get
results, assuming the basic structure of our system is as it is today.
If you assume a totalitarian society, and that is really what you are
advocating, that is another matter. But you are still living in a
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society where there are some differences in position and rewards,
and there are a certain amount of programs to remedy those differences.
PROF. ROGOW: I do not feel compelled to answer that. I respect your
view on it and hope you believe that I am not being dishonest in my
position because I am not.
PROF. GALANTER:

The arrogance of talking about income cut-offs

and the least financial burden on the providers of a particular kind
of service is somewhat mitigated by the fact that that service is a
state created monopoly. The state has not only created and enforced the monopoly, but basically has allowed a monopolist to
adopt a number of highly restrictive practices in terms of controlling the supply of the service available; restricting information to
the public to make effective use of that service, and in a number of
ways, has allowed the monopolist to cultivate his monopoly and
extend it. So it seems to me that we are not talking about the burden on totally innocent producers of products for the society, but
basically people whose stock in trade is monopoly conferred on them
by the public.

